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USE OF CONGRESSIONAL RULES TO DELAY
PROGRESS IN CIVIL RIGHTS POLICY
Charles B. Rangel*
INTRODUCTION
In its latest review of the civil rights record of the 96th Congress, the
United States Commission on Civil Rights voiced concern over increas-
ing use of amendments that limit or cut funds for established civil
rights programs. As the Commission stated, "Congress has permitted
amendments designed to weaken civil rights laws to be added to appro-
priation bills usually without Committee hearings and with only
minimal floor debate."' This use of "limitation amendments" is rap-
idly increasing. From 1963 to 1980, the number of appropriation
amendments offered on the House floor increased from forty-seven to
one hundred sixty-five.2 Furthermore, the percentage of limitation
amendments that have been adopted has grown from forty-one percent
to seventy-five percent.3
Many Members of Congress are alarmed at both the use and suc-
cess of this practice. During the 96th Congress countless hours were
spent debating riders that sought to limit funding for federal agencies
and thereby to change federal policy, predominantly in the area of civil
rights.' The impropriety of using limitation amendments to reduce the
impact of substantive law is apparent from a reading of the provisions
of House Rule XXIV Provision One of the rule states that no appropri-
ation amendment will be reported or will be in order, if it has not pre-
viously been authorized by law.6 The second provision of House Rule
XXI prohibits debate on the House floor regarding unauthorized
amendments.'
* Member, United States House of Representatives (D-New York); member, House Ways and
Means Committee. B.S., New York University, 1957; J.D., St. John's University School of
Law, 1960; Assistant United States Attorney, Southern District of New York, 1961-66.
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I. U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, CIVIL RIGHTS AND RIGHTS: REVIEW OF CIVIL RIGHTS
OF 96TH CONGRESS 1 (1980) [hereinafter cited as REVIEW].
2. 38 CONG. Q. 3252 (1980).
3. Id
4. A prime example was the attempt to limit funding for Medicaid abortions by attaching a
rider to the appropriation bill for Department of Health, Education, and Welfare in 1977. 33
CONG. Q. ALMANAC 296 (1977); see text accompanying notes 16-18 supra.
5. W. BROWN, JEFFERSON'S MANUAL AND RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 96TH
CONG. 525 (1979) [hereinafter cited as W. BROWN].
6. Id
7. Id
Use of Congressional Rules
Unfortunately, legislators who comprehend the significance of Rule
XXI8 are sharpening their drafting skills in order to circumvent its pro-
visions. The Rule refers to positive appropriations. Careful drafting of
an amendment that on its face merely limits funding for a particular
agency falls outside the scope of the Rule. Yet, limitation amendments
enact major policy changes without recourse to normal legislative chal-
lenges. Their impact upon enactment is equal to the impact of positive
amendments that clearly require authorization. This article explores
the significant increase in the use of limitation amendments to appro-
priation bills that affect substantive policy on civil rights.
A realistic interpretation of Rule XXI bars the use of limitation
amendments. The use of these amendments not only subverts the
proper consideration of policy issues in committee, but presents a sig-
nificant threat to the status of civil rights mandated by court decisions
and executive orders. This article will analyze the effect of the limita-
tion mechanism on the House's consideration of policy issues and illus-
trate the negative impact of the limitation amendment on civil rights in
the 96th Congress. Finally, the article will suggest action to curb this
practice and thereby to protect civil rights.
LIMITATION AMENDMENTS AND ABUSES OF THE
LEGISLATIVE PROCESS
Proper Role of Committees in Legislative Study
The roles of authorization and appropriation committees are funda-
mentally different. The authorization committees develop programs
and authorize ceilings for expenditures. The appropriation committees
apportion public funds among programs that have been authorized.9
For example, each year the House considers an appropriation bill for
the Department of Health and Human Services. That bill sets ceilings
for the funding of various programs within the Department's jurisdic-
tion. During debate on the Department's appropriation bill in 1980,
the Ashbrook Amendment' ° was offered to prohibit expenditures for
the enforcement of employment regulations. By retrenching funds for
employment quotas, the Ashbrook Amendment substantively repealed
an established federal employment policy."I
8. Id
9. M. JEWELL & S. PATTERSON, THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS IN THE UNITED STATES 460 (3rd
ed. 1977).
10. Sec. 309. None of the funds appropriated by this Act shall be expended to enforce such
part or parts of the regulations promulgated to carry out the provisions of Title IX of
the Education Amendments of 1972, Public Law 92-318, which have been found by
three United States circuit courts of appeal to exceed the statutory authority under
which they were promulgated, and by one United States circuit court of appeals not to
exceed such authority, during any part of the fiscal year ending September 30, 1981, in
which the conflict in these decisions shall not have been resolved in favor of the valid-
ity of the challenged part or parts of the regulations.
126 CONG. REC. H8,000 (daily ed. Aug. 27, 1980).
11. See text accompanying note 38 infra.
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This amendment was in effect substantive legislation. The House
Parliamentarian should have referred it to the appropriate authoriza-
tion committee for study and recommendation, before it was consid-
ered during floor discussion of the bill.
House Rule XXI12 should determine the fate of such an amendment
to an appropriation bill. The second provision of the Rule states:
No appropriation shall be reported in any general appropriation bill,
or be in order as an amendment thereto, for any expenditure not previ-
ously authorized by law, unless in continuation of appropriations for
such public works and objects as are already in progress. Nor shall any
provision in any such bill or amendment thereto changing existing law
be in order, except such as being germane to the subject matter of the
bill shall retrench expenditures by the reduction of the number and
salary of the officers of the United States, by the reduction of the com-
pensation of any person paid out of the Treasury of the United States,
or by the reduction of amounts of money covered by the bill: Pro-
vided, That it shall be in order further to amend such bill upon the
report of the committee or any joint commission authorized by law or
the House Members of any such commission having jurisdiction of the
subject matter of such amendment, which amendment bein germane
to the subject matter of the bill shall retrench expenditures.
The limitation amendment acts to bypass established deliberative
procedure. A change in regulations is a policy question which is prop-
erly considered by the authorizing committee. Manipulation of the
committee process leads to the breakdown of the entire deliberative
process. As a result, Congress is unable to legislate in the most effective
manner.
The Authorization Process
The authorizing committee is the body responsible for establishing
substantive policy. These committees hold extensive hearings on each
funding request, at which time the secretary of the department testifies
as the prime witness justifying the allocation. This process gives com-
mittee members the opportunity to review all programs that fall within
the purview of the particular authorization bill. It also allows the com-
mittee to review in detail the performance of the agencies, a traditional
Congressional function. In an era of accusations of governmental
waste, the importance of this "oversight function" cannot be mini-
mized. Ideally, after completion of hearings, the committee presents
Congress with a report analyzing funding requests and departmental
objectives. This record is the principal resource used in making voting
decisions on the authorizing legislation. More importantly, it serves as
a tool for the appropriation committee's deliberations on the actual
funding level for the department.
12. See W. BROWN, supra note 5, at 525.
13. Id
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Richard F. Fenno, Jr., wrote in The Power of the Purse ' 4 that "(t)he
Appropriations Committee . . . is responsible for substantive policy in
a defined area. But they can and do alter and initiate policy in their
own way." Fenno's comment illustrates his recognition that the appro-
priation mechanism has encroached upon areas of public policy re-
served for authorizing committees.' 5 Recognition must not imply
acquiescence, however. There are inherent dangers involved in subver-
sion of the deliberative process, not only for Congress as' an institution
but also for particular groups within society.
Any policy change initiated in the appropriation committee lacks
the serious study given by an authorizing committee. The appropria-
tion committee lacks special knowledge of and familiarity with the par-
ticular issue or relevant legislation. It is a particularly ineffective forum
in which to decide civil rights policy for the United States. Members of
the proper authorizing committee are not afforded the opportunity to
evaluate the appropriation "riders," nor is the committee record made
available on the House floor.
Legislating in Haste
The use of limitation amendments causes practical and ethical
problems for Congress in the discharge of its duty to provide funds for
operation of the federal government. Frequently, copies of the amend-
ment or "rider" are not available when Congress is scheduled to vote,
nor are Congressional staff aides provided with adequate time to re-
view appropriation amendments and prepare background material for
meaningful debate or reflective voting.
Yet, Congressional debate on limitation amendments consumes
valuable floor time and delays passage of funding bills. For example,
the Hyde Amendment 6 to deny funding for Medicaid abortions kept
appropriations for the former Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare embroiled in unnecessary debate for two months into fiscal
year 1977.17 Limitation amendments were also used to restrain rescis-
sion of tax-exempt status for "white flight" private schools during con-
sideration of funding for the Internal Revenue Service' 8 and to prevent
the Justice Department from providing legal services to defend, sup-
port, or protect the lifestyle of gay Americans.19
An anti-civil rights amendment to an appropriation bill also
presents a paradox in voting decisions. Introduction of these amend-
14. R. FENNO, THE POWER OF TH, PURSE: APPROPRIATIONS POLITICS IN CONGRESS 689 (1966).
15. 38 CONG. Q., supra note 2, at 3252.
16. Hyde Amend. of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-123, § 109, 93 Stat. 926 (amending Title XIX, Social
Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396 et seq.).
17. 33 CONG. Q. ALMANAC, supra note 4, at 296.
18. 126 CONG. REC. H7,289 (daily ed. Aug. 20, 1980). The Internal Revenue Service is a divi-
sion of the Department of Treasury. It receives funding from the Treasury and Postal Serv-
ice Appropriations.
19. 126 CONG. REC. H6,252 (daily ed. July 22, 1980).
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ments on the House floor is possible only if the existing rules of Con-
gress are circumvented. Yet, these riders are either accepted or rejected
on the floor because the funding measures to which they are attached
are indispensable to the continued operation of the federal government.
Despite the inequity of changing civil rights policy without a proper
hearing, capitulation is necessary in order to assure government fund-
ing for essential services to the nation.
LIMITATION AMENDMENTS: SPECIFIC APPROPRIATION
LEGISLATION IN THE 96TH CONGRESS
The Walker Amendment: Labor, Education, and Human Services
Appropriations
20
During the second session of the 96th Congress, Representative
Robert S. Walker offered an amendment prohibiting expenditures of
funds for the issuance, implementation, or enforcement of regulations
that establish school quotas based on race, creed, color, or sex. This
amendment affected appropriations for the Department of Labor, the
Department of Education, and the Department of Health and Human21
Services. Its passage would have greatly hampered the Department
of Labor's effort to implement Executive Order No. 11,246,22 assuring
women and minorities equal employment. Further, it would have cate-
gorically prohibited quota systems, placing Congress in conflict with
executive and judicial application of this option to alleviate past dis-
crimination.23
The Supreme Court has provided relief for past civil rights viola-
tions. In Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,24 the
Court sanctioned the use of "mathematical ratios" as a "convenient
starting point" in formulating a desegregation remedy in primary
schools. Lower courts have also used quotas to assure that desegrega-
tion plans work effectively. In Adams v. Calfano,25 the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia ordered the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare to revoke approval of plans to desegre-
gate public higher education systems in six states, because the plans
evidenced no progress in minority admissions.26
Opponents of quotas, goals, ratios, or any numerical requirement
interpret Regents of the University of California v. Bakke27 as a rein-
forcement of their position. A cursory reading of Bakke produces that
20. 126 CONG. REC. H7,988 (daily ed. Aug. 27, 1980).
21. Id
22. Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. § 169 (1974).
23. Id
24. 402 U.S. I (1970).
25. 430 F. Supp. 118 (D.D.C. 1977).
26. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Legal Analysis of Riders Attached to
Various Appropriations Bills Pending in the 96th Congress as They Relate to Civil Rights
Enforcement 4 (Nov. 13, 1980).
27. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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result, because the Supreme Court held that a voluntarily adopted
quota system for admission of students to a state-supported medical
school denied the white male plaintiff equal protection under the Fif-
teenth Amendment. It is important to note that the Court considered
alternative theories: the constitutional argument and the claim under
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. As a result, there was no
majority holding in Bakke.28 In announcing the opinion of the Court,
however, Justice Powell implied that minority admissions programs
which fall short of an absolute quota would be within the law.
Thus far, courts have taken a position favoring careful application
of percentage goals in minority hiring and admissions.29 In United
Steelworkers ofAmerica v. Weber,3" the Supreme Court, citing Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,31 validated the use of private, vol-
untary affirmative action plans adopted by employers and unions to
eliminate "conspicuous racial imbalance." The holding in Weber sig-
nals the Supreme Court's acceptance of affirmative action programs to
remedy past discrimination.
Collins Amendment: Department of Justice Appropriations
Representative James M. Collins offered an amendment to the Jus-
tice Department's appropriation bill, limiting the Department's support
for school busing. The amendment specifically forbade suits by the
Department "to require directly or indirectly the transportation of any
student to a school other than the school which is nearest the student's
home."32
Three federal statutes grant the Department authority to seek judi-
cial relief for unlawful segregation in public schools. Title IV of the
1964 Civil Rights Act 33 empowers the United States Attorney General
to institute civil desegregation actions against public schools and col-
leges. Title V114 of the same act grants the Department authority to
enforce its prohibition of discrimination in any program or activity re-
ceiving federal financial assistance. Finally, the Equal Educational
Opportunities Act of 1974,'3 which prohibits deliberate segregation by
28. In Bakke, id., the Court assessed the strict quota admissions program at the medical school
of the University of California at Davis for constitutionality under the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and validity under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. Justices Stewart, Rehnquist, Stevens, and Chief Justice-Burger found the strict racial
quota invilid under Title VI. Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun held the
program both valid and constitutional. Justice Powell determined that Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1447, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975a-1975d, 2000a-2000h-6 (1976 & Supp.
II 1978), prohibited only racial classifications that violated the equal protection clause and
found the program violative of the equal protection clause because of the existence of less
restrictive alternatives.
29. See, e.g., U.S. v. City of Miami, 614 F.2d 1322 (5th Cir. 1980).
30. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)-(d) (1976 Supp. 11 1978).
32. See generally REVIEW, supra note I, at 5.
33. 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-6.
34. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d.
35. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1228, 1608, 1701-1710, 1712-1718, 1720-1721, 1751-1758 (1976).
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an educational agency, provides for civil actions by the Attorney Gen-
eral on behalf of any individual denied equal educational opportunity
under the Act.36 The Supreme Court, in McDaniel v. Barresi,3 7 has also
specifically upheld school desegregation plans, stating that "any other
approach would freeze the status quo that is the very target of desegre-
gation processes."
Failure to fund such legislatively mandated controls involves sub-
stantive policy change; it is also a deprivation of Congressionally guar-
anteed protection for civil rights. Furthermore, it is an unwarranted
collateral attack on judicial decisions upholding civil rights legislation.
Ashbrook Amendment: The Department of Education Appropriations
An amendment authored by Representative John M. Ashbrook
sought to deny funding for enforcement of the Department of Educa-
tion's regulations requiring state and local educational agencies to de-
velop programs for students with limited proficiency in English.38 The
amendment cut funds specifically appropriated for bilingual education.
In Lau v. Nichols,39 a class of non-English speaking students chal-
lenged the lack of adequate supplemental language instruction as a vio-
lation of equal educational opportunity under both the 1964 Civil
Rights Act 40 and the Fourteenth Amendment. 4' The Supreme Court
held that proof of discriminatory effect alone was sufficient to establish
a prima facie violation of Title VI of the Act. In the majority opinion
Justice Douglas stated, "[Tihere is no equality of treatment merely by
providing students with .the same facilities, textbooks, teachers, and
curriculum; for students who do not understand English are effectively
foreclosed from any meaningful education. '42 The Court did not at-
tempt to fashion remedies, but relied on local officials to devise a rea-
sonable solution.
Regulations for the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
were promulgated to guide local school districts as they sought to com-
ply with the Lau decision.43 Denial of funding for these regulations
would have further delayed the institution of bilingual education for
limited English speaking students. During House discussion, propo-
36. 20 U.S.C. § 1706 (1976).
37. 402 U.S. 39, 41 (1974).
38. 126 CONG. REC., supra note 10, at H7,965.
39. 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d.
41. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I.
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immuni-
ties of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Id.
42. 414 U.S. at 566.
43. See note 25 supra, at 12-14.
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nents of the Ashbrook Amendment only briefly mentioned Lau v.
Nichols."
SUGGESTED REMEDIES AND SOLUTIONS
House Procedure and Rule XXI
Louis Deschler, perhaps the most knowledgeable and respected
House Parliamentarian, interpreted Rule XXI to preclude any discus-
sion effecting a substantive change in existing law during debate on
appropriation bills. 5 This view governed House procedure for many
years; the Congressional Record is replete with instances where the
Parliamentarian sustained it.4 6 The Deschler interpretation should be
followed to prohibit limitation amendments to appropriation bills that
portend any alteration in substantive policy.
However, certain structural problems, inherent within a political
body such as the House, militate against effective operation of Rule
XXI. Both political parties argue that the primary consideration in re-
viewing and interpreting House rules is "the public interest." Yet, po-
litical and parochial interests result in divergent views of "public
interest." Interpretation of Rule XX147 is often dependent upon the
political interest of the party in power. Party politics is not the only
reason that reform of House Rules is difficult, however. In many in-
stances, politics involves personalities, and reform depends upon the
willingness of individuals to compromise in favor of the public good.
As David P. Price has noted,4 8 fault does not lie with the rules of Con-
gress or its seniority system, but with its individual members who seek
to protect their selfish, parochial interests.
Members of Congress supporting fundamentalist or conservative is-
sues often experience frustration with the Congressional committee sys-
tem. In the 96th Congress, for example, legislation prohibiting busing
and abortion was often referred to committees controlled by liberals
where it could be "bottled up." According to Representative James M.
Collins, "For [twenty-five] years Congress has been controlled by lib-
eral Democrats and [no conservative can] get any type of freedom from
regulation out of their committees. The only recourse [conservatives]
have is to go to the appropriations bill."' 49 Until the House Rules pro-
vide the Congressional minority with an alternative to the introduction
and debate of policy issues on the floor, the discouraging practice of
introducing limitation amendments will continue.
44. 126 CONG. REC., supra note 10, at H7,967.
45. L. Deschler, Deschler's Procedure in the United States House of Representatives 435 (1979)
(available at U.S. Gov't Printing Office).
46. W. BROWN, supra note 5, at 534-536.
47. Id at 525.
48. D. PRICE, WHO MAKES THE LAWS? CREATIVITY AND POWER IN SENATE COMMITTEES II
(1972).




The "political question" doctrine, set forth by the Supreme Court in
Baker v. Carr,50 precludes judicial intervention into matters that the
Constitution textually commits to a coordinate branch of the govern-
ment. Article I of the Constitution states that "each house may deter-
mine the Rules of its Proceedings." Therefore, under the Constitution,
the courts may not inquire into the Congressional appropriation pro-
cess, because the procedural method of allocating funds is a function
reserved for the legislative branch. The Court applied this doctrine in
Powell v. McCormack,5 ruling, on constitutional grounds, that judicial
interpretation of House Rules governing qualifications of members is
improper. The Court disregarded previous rulings regarding the
House's refusal to seat members that were based on non-constitutional
grounds. Since this distinction is not apparent in the Constitution's
"rules clause," courts are unwilling to review Congressional procedure.
Recourse to the judicial system to preclude Congressional use of
funding mechanisms that erode civil rights programs is equally ineffec-
tive. First, the inevitable delays in civil rights litigation result in years
of sacrifice and expense, before the matter is resolved. Second, the
courts have been unwilling to construct remedies for plaintiffs denied
access to federal programs because appropriation amendments have
curtailed funding. A prime example is the Hyde Amendment52 to the
Department of Health and Human Services funding bill, which denied
funds for certain medically necessary abortions under Title XIX of the
Social Security Act. In Harris v. McRae,53 the Supreme Court ad-
dressed a due process challenge to the Hyde Amendment's limitation
on medicaid funding for abortions. Justice Stewart responded to argu-
ments that denial of funding results in deprivation of a constitutional
right to abortion established in Roe v. Wade." He stated,
[A]lthough the government may not place obstacles in the path of a
woman's exercise of her freedom of choice, it need not remove those
not of its own creation. Indigency falls within the latter category. The
financial constraints that restrict an indigent woman's ability to enjoy
50. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). The "political question" doctrine of justiciability is a function of the
separation of powers. The Baker court, addressing a challenge to Congressional apportion-
ment, identified six factors that described a political question, stating:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate politi-
cal department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of
a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking
independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate
branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a politi-
cal decision already made; or the potentiality of embarassment from multifarious pro-
nouncements by various departments on one question.
Id at 217.
51. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
52. See note 15 supra.
53. 100 S. Ct. 2671 (1980).
54. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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the full range of constitutionally protected freedom of choice are the
product not of governmental restrictions on access to abortions, but
rather of her indigency.
55
If a constitutional right does not imply a correlative right to govern-
ment funding to permit the exercise of that right, the remedy must
come from within Congress itself.
The Solutions
During a review of the bill referral process for newly proposed bills,
the Select Committee on Committees received a letter coauthored by
the chairmen and ranking minority members of seventeen House au-
thorizing committees. This letter urged the Select Committee to adopt
a resolution that would require the referral of all legislation in general
appropriation bills to the relevant authorizing committee, with strict
time limits for review.56 Although the committee report did not make
final recommendations in this area, it called upon the Rules Committee
to take additional action.
57
During the 95th Congress a House Democratic Study Group report
made the following recommendations to protect civil rights programs
throughout the appropriation process:
(1) Prohibit appropriation riders not approved by the proper House
Committee.
(2) Require a two-thirds vote for the approval of appropriation rid-
ers.
(3) Allow the Rules Committee to make recommendations regarding
riders on an ad hoc basis.5"
These recommendations alone will not resolve the apparent dispute
among members concerned about integrity of the legislative system and
members frustrated in attempts to propose conservative legislation.
The solution is simple. The Congressional leadership must do "just
that"-it must lead. The leadership must encourage all committee
chairmen to consider bills and amendments in an unbiased and timely
fashion. When issues are "bottled up" in committee, the Speaker of the
House must persuade the chairmen to move legislation onto the House
floor. If the chairmen refuse, a mechanism must be created to allow the
ranking majority and minority committee leaders to call measures for
immediate committee vote. If the committee votes in favor of the
measure, it would then move to the House floor, where a two-thirds
vote would be necessary both to commence debate and to obtain final
passage. Equity dictates that the will of Congress not be thwarted be-
cause one member is in a position to hold up legislation.
55. Harris v. McRae, 100 S. Ct. at 2688.
56. HOUSE SELECT COMM. ON COMM., 96TH CONG., 2D SEss., FINAL REPORT 385 (1980).
57. Id at 386.




As we enter the 97th Congress, it is my hope that the practice of
offering riders to appropriation bills is halted. House Rules have estab-
lished procedures for enacting legislation. These procedures have
served Congress well because they call for comprehensive hearings to
be conducted by the appropriate committee. After hearings the com-
mittee creates a record that all House members may review regarding
the merits or flaws of a proposal. Absent such careful study, House
members are deprived of the opportunity to cast informed votes on is-
sues of crucial importance.
Continued use of limitation amendments portends an ominous fu-
ture, not only for the institution of Congress, but for the fate of civil
rights in this nation. Even though none of the amendments discussed
in this article was signed into law, their introduction indicates that
there is a growing tide of retrenchment in the civil rights arena. Those
Members of Congress committed to advancement of civil rights must
work with the House leadership to advance Congressional reform as
well. Gains made in civil rights policy must be protected. Our legisla-
tive process must retain its integrity. The challenge confronting Con-
gress is an ambitious one, one in which victory must be achieved for the
good of our nation.
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